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Using data for 341 enterprises listed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and taking R&D expenditure as an indicator of innovation 
investment, this paper implements multiple linear regression to test whether venture 
capital promotes corporate innovation input. It also considers the relationship between 
the syndicated investment of venture capital and innovation input. The results show 
that venture capital indeed promotes R&D in the invested enterprises. The innovation 
input of syndicated investment enterprises is significantly higher than that of sole 
investment enterprises. Under syndicated investment, the higher the number of 
syndicated investment members and the greater the heterogeneity of the shareholding 
ratio among the members, the higher is the innovation input. The reputation of the 
syndicated investment team, however, has no significant impact on innovation input.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Enterprises are the main players in market economies. Their technological 
innovation capabilities are closely related to their performance and growth. More 
specifically, factors such as enterprise financing methods, governance structure, 
and level of financial market development and related policies will have differing 
impacts on enterprise innovation activity. Capital is a decisive input factor, since 
financing constraints inhibit innovation activities of enterprises. Generally, the 
innovation input of enterprises stems from internal and external financing. The 
former refers mainly to enterprises using their own capital investment, while 
the latter mainly pertains to banking system (in debt financing markets) and 
Venture Capital (VC) (in equity financing markets) (Fei, 2010). In choosing target 
borrowers, banks focus mainly on company size, collateral and income level, but 
VC is not sensitive to these factors. Therefore, in Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SME) financing, VC has several advantages over bank financing (Liang, 2015).
VC can not only provide sufficient funding for enterprises, it also may actively 
participate in the management of invested companies. VC provides a range of 
value-added services, such as helping to improve corporate governance structure, 
providing consultation and support in human resources, among others. VC has 
characteristics that differ from traditional financial and industrial capital, and its 
new financing method of “financing + cooperating” is highly valued by the Chinese 
government. Some local governments in China have already introduced a series 
of policies to encourage VC development through tax incentives, other one-off 
incentives or subsidies, and loss compensation. For example, if investing eligibly in 
unlisted small and medium-sized high-tech enterprises through equity investment 
for more than 2 years, a VC enterprise may deduct 70% of the investment amount 
from taxable income in the year following the 2-year investment period; when 
taxable income for the year is less than the deduction, it may be deducted in the 
subsequent tax year.3 Further, VC and Angel investors are allowed to withdraw 
risk reserves, which are used to compensate investment losses, based on 10% of the 
fund’s long-term investment balance.4 In the current environment, it is especially 
important to understand whether VC firms meet policy expectations and play an 
important role in promoting corporate innovation.
VC firms face high investment risk, so they often adopt a syndicated investment 
strategy; that is, several VC firms jointly invest in a target enterprise. Syndicated 
investment is vital in the VC market. Compared with individual investment, it 
can not only diversify risk, but also integrate the advantages of each investor 
to generate a resource-sharing effect and a value-sharing effect. Therefore, this 
syndicated investment strategy is highly favored by both VC firms and invested 
companies.
There is little literature on the relationship between VC and enterprise 
innovation in China, and research on how the characteristics of VC firms influence 
enterprise innovation are even rarer. The relationship between VC and enterprise 
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innovation requires additional empirical evidence. To enrich the existing research 
on VC and enterprise innovation in China, this paper takes the companies listed 
on the GEM market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a sample to explore 
the impact of VC on corporate innovation input and the role of the syndicated 
investment strategy of VC firms. It also examines the impact of the characteristics 
of VC on innovation input under syndicated investment.
This work is significant for several reasons. It is based on VC, a vital 
component of the equity financing market,5 and it verifies and supplements prior 
research on VC and enterprise innovation. Existing research on the relationship 
between VC investment form and strategy and corporate innovation investment 
is not sufficient. Therefore, this paper uses a VC syndicated investment sample 
to supplement the literature. Further, this paper explores the varying impacts of 
various characteristics of syndicated investment teams on enterprise innovation 
input, to determine what form of syndicated investment can better enhance 
the incubation of innovation. The purpose of this paper is to help improve the 
efficiency of incubation of innovation by providing a reference framework for VC 
firms to choose syndicated investment partners. In addition, it will help innovative 
enterprises choose suitable VC firms.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
A. VC and Enterprise Innovation
It is generally believed that VC is a major factor behind the high level of 
technological innovation in American companies (Keuschnigg, 2004). According 
to Kortum and Lerner (2000), VC-backed companies are more innovative and have 
more valuable patents. Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) show that, compared with 
non-VC-backed companies, VC-backed companies are more radical in innovation, 
the speed at which products are introduced into the market is significantly faster, 
and their market strategies are more radical. Tian and Wang (2011) find, from 
the perspective of failure tolerance, that Initial Public Offerings (IPO) companies 
supported by VC with high risk tolerance are more innovative, and the impact 
of failure tolerance on company innovation is on a sustained basis. That is, the 
attitude of VC firms toward failure may be internalized by the company and 
become part of the corporate culture, which can help the company to form a 
unique culture of innovation. However, some research does not fully recognize 
the role of VC in promoting corporate innovation. Roosenboom and Popov (2012) 
use data from several countries and find that the positive impact of VC exists only 
in countries where the VC industry thrives. Further, in countries where VC is 
supported by the government, businesses are easy to start, taxation is low, and 
the regulatory environment is loose, making it more conducive for VC firms to 
promote enterprise innovation.
Zheng and Li (2001) believe that VC plays an irreplaceable role in helping 
small- and medium-sized startups. VC can supervise a company’s innovation 
activities and use its own rich market experience to guide and correct the direction 
5 According to Zhang and Liao (2011) and Chen et al. (2017), this paper does not distinguish between 
VC and PE, and collectively refers to both as VC.
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of enterprise innovation. At the same time, participation of VC reduces the degree 
of information asymmetry between investors and enterprises. Wu (2009) believes 
that the integration of capital and technology brought about by VC capital support 
and its participation in enterprise management promotes enterprise innovation. 
Fu et al. (2012) find that compared with other institutional investors, VC can better 
promote innovation investment in GEM companies. Chen et al. (2017) and Wang 
and Hu (2017) also find that VC plays a significant role in improving innovation 
performance.
VC firms are professional investors that usually specialize in particular 
investment fields. They accumulate industry resources and gain relevant experience 
in business management (Chen et al., 2017). VC often participates actively in the 
operation and governance of the invested company by joining the board. They use 
professional management experience to improve corporate governance structure 
and provide support in areas such as strategy making, human resources, and 
financing. These value-added services are especially useful in the invested firms’ 
innovation activities, since they overcome defects in terms of business management 
and resources. At the same time, VC can effectively supervise innovation activities 
of the invested companies, ensuring their quality and efficiency. Compared with 
traditional corporate activities (such as manufacturing and marketing), innovation 
activities are always accompanied by high risk stemming from the large amount 
of investment, the long-term research and development process, and many other 
unpredictable factors (Holmstrom, 1989). Fortunately, the high risk in corporate 
innovation activity may bring high returns—investors have a chance to gain 
higher exit returns. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: VC participation has a positive impact on corporate innovation.
B. Syndicated Investment and Corporate Innovation Input
As a common investment strategy for VC, syndicated investment has more 
advantages than individual investment. For example, syndicated investment 
enables resource sharing and provides invested enterprises with rich resources 
and value-added services. Moreover, syndicated investment behavior reduces 
information asymmetry, conveys a positive signal that the company is worth 
investing, thus attracting more investors to fund the company’s innovation 
activities (Leland and Pyle, 1977). The literature also finds that syndicated 
investment-backed companies have better competence in corporate governance, 
and there is a positive correlation between this competence and the number of 
syndicated investment members (Shen and Hu, 2014). In addition, Tian (2012) 
analyzes 30,861 companies and concludes that syndicated investment can not only 
promote incubation of innovative products and improve their market value, it also 
improves IPO performance. We thus propose Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Compared with sole investment enterprises, innovation input 
in syndicated investment enterprises is higher.
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C. Characteristics of Syndicated Investment and Enterprise Innovation Input
The syndicated investment model is favored by VC firms in several countries. But 
how will syndicated investment with different characteristics affect enterprise 
innovation input? The present paper discusses the relationship between enterprise 
innovation input and syndicated investment characteristics, such as number of 
investment members, reputation characteristics, and proportion of shareholding.
First, more risk organizations involved in syndicated investment means more 
financial support, professional guidance, and other resources. Further, they also 
bring a higher level of risk diversification. Lu et al. (2017) show that the innovation 
ability of the invested company grows with the number of syndicated investment 
institutions. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: The innovation input of the invested company is positively 
correlated with the number of institutions that invest in a syndicated investment.
Reputable VC firms often have rich investment experience and a well-
established network of relationships. They play a positive role in discovering and 
nurturing high-quality enterprises, providing better value-added services and 
support for the invested enterprises. Therefore, VC firms with strong reputation 
are more attractive, and the enterprises backed by them are undoubtedly 
favored by the market. Gompers et al. (1996) suggest that a “reputation chasing 
motivation” exists in younger institutions—they try to build their reputation and 
raise new funds as soon as possible by listing their invested companies earlier than 
do mature institutions. Although this “reputation chasing behavior” can increase 
the short-term value of invested companies (for example, reducing R&D expenses 
in the short-term can increase profit in the current period), it sacrifices long-term 
value. Based on the analysis above, we propose Hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4: Firm innovation input is positively correlated with the 
reputation of the syndicated investment team.
Finally, differences in shareholding ratio among members of the syndicated 
investment will influence investment results. Generally, syndicated investment 
can diversify investment risk. If there are large differences in members’ investment 
amounts, however, the effect of risk diversification will be nullified. When a 
particular member holds a relatively large proportion of shares, moral hazard 
tends to occur and other members are prone to “free-riding,” which reduces the 
positive impact of syndicated investment on corporate innovation. Therefore, more 
dispersed shareholding can diversify investment risk and enable each syndicated 
investment member to participate in corporate governance and promote corporate 
innovation more actively. Based on the analysis above, we propose our fifth 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The heterogeneity of syndicated investment members’ 
shareholding ratio is an unfavorable factor in enterprise innovation input.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Sample and Data
We select firms listed on the GEM market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over 
the period January 1, 2012 to July 14, 2017 as our initial sample; we use annual 
data. On the one hand, the GEM was originally created to provide an ideal exit 
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channel for domestic VC, and it brings together many VC-backed companies. On 
the other hand, unlike the main board or SME board, the GEM is more suitable for 
listing VC-supported enterprises. Therefore, the Shenzhen GEM, founded in 2009, 
provides a good research sample for our study.
Our data comprise three parts: (1) VC data: a sample of VC-backed firms listed 
on the Shenzhen GEM from 2012 to 2017 (obtained from CVsource6) and relevant 
data on VC firms, such as year of establishment (obtained from Wind7). For data 
that cannot be obtained from these databases, we collect data manually through 
publicly available resources, such as prospectuses of the listed companies. (2) 
Indicator of company’s innovation capability (R&D data), from iFinD8. (3) Relevant 
financial information for listed companies, from CSMAR9.
After excluding companies with missing data and financial enterprises, the 
final sample includes 341 companies, of which 227 (66.57%) have a VC background 
at the time of listing. Judging from yearly data, VC-backed enterprises form the 
majority, accounting for more than 60% every year.
B. Variable Definitions
B1. Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is listed company R&D expenditure. As an indicator 
that every listed company must reveal, R&D expenditure is highly available and 
representative. It measures company investment in innovation activities and 
can reflect company attitude toward them, showing the most timely and direct 
performance of company efforts in innovation. Therefore, based on existing 
research, this paper takes the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure to measure 
company innovation input (Zhan et al., 2015).
B2. Independent Variables
We set two dummy variables, VC (VC) and syndicated investment (Syn). Drawing 
on Wu et al. (2012), we judge whether the shareholders of the company are VC 
firms by consulting databases, the investment community, the website “sky-eye 
inspection10”, and prospectuses. If at least one investing institution among the top-
ten shareholders at the time of listing is a VC firm, the company is regarded as a 
VC-backed company, VC=1, otherwise VC=0. If there is more than one VC firms 
among the top-ten shareholders, it is a syndicated investment, Syn=1, otherwise it 
is considered an independent investment, Syn=0.
SynNum refers to the number of VC firms among the top-ten shareholders 
in the syndicated investment sample. Further, the reputation of the syndicated 
investment team (SynRep) is measured using the reputation of the leading VC 
firms, while the institution’s reputation is measured by its age, that is, the number 
of years between establishment of the institution and the IPO of its invested 
6 See https://www.cvsource.com.cn/
7 See https://www.wind.com.cn/
8 See http://www.51ifind.com/
9 See http://us.gtadata.com/
10 See https://www.tianyancha.com/
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company. When the age of the leading institution is equal to or greater than 6 
years, SynRep=1, otherwise SynRep=0.
Both Gomper (1996) and Hsu (2004) believe that an institution’s age is, to 
some extent, a suitable indicator of a ’s experience and reputation. Gomper (1996) 
separates high-reputation VCs from low-reputation VCs in terms of whether age 
is greater than 6 years. This author finds that there are 12 significant differences 
between these two kinds of VC, such as the average amount of subsequent 
fundraising, the leading VC’s number of seats in the invested company’s board 
and its shareholding ratio in the company. Due to data availability, we also use VC 
age to measure reputation, taking 6 years as the dividing line.
In portraying the heterogeneity of VC shareholding ratio, this paper draws 
on Beckman and Haunschild (2002) and Lu et al. (2017) to construct a coefficient 
of variation for measuring the heterogeneity of the continuous variables, that is, 
the ratio of standard deviation to mean of the shareholding ratio. The larger the 
ratio, the greater the heterogeneity of the shareholding ratio between different 
syndicated investment members. The heterogeneity indicator is built as follows:
               (1)
where Sharei is the shareholding ratio of VC firms i.
B3. Control Variables
Based on the literature, this paper takes company size, profitability, solvency, and 
policy factors as control variables (Chemmanur et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2017; Lu et 
al., 2017). Company size (Lnasset) is the natural logarithm of the company’s total 
assets at the end of a year; profitability (ROE) is the ratio of company net profit 
to total equity at the end of a year; solvency (Lev) is the ratio of company total 
liabilities to total assets at the end of a year; policy factor (Lngov) is the natural 
logarithm of government subsidies received by the company.
In this table, all variables appearing in this paper are defined and explained.
Variable Definition Variable Name
Dependent 
Variable
Innovation Input
the natural logarithm of
company R&D expenditure
LnR&D
Independent 
Variables
Venture Capital
dummy variable, VC=1 if it is a VC-
backed company, otherwise VC=0
VC
Syndicated 
Investment
dummy variable, Syn=1 if it is a 
syndicated investment, otherwise 
Syn=0
Syn
Number of VC 
firms
number of VC firms among the top-
ten shareholders in the syndicated 
investment sample 
SynNum
Table 1.
Variable Definition
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In this table, all variables appearing in this paper are defined and explained.
Variable Definition Variable Name
Independent 
Variables
Syndicated 
Investment Team 
Reputation
leading VC firm’s age, dummy 
variable, SynRep=1 if the age of 
the leading institution is equal to 
or greater than 6 years, otherwise 
SynRep=0.
SynRep
Heterogeneity of 
VC Shareholding 
Ratio
VC Shareholding Ratio 
Heterogeneity in the year of the 
invested company’s IPO
ShareHetero
Control Variables 
 
Company Size
the natural logarithm of the 
company’s total assets at the end 
of a year
Lnasset
Profitability
the ratio of company net profit to 
total equity at the end of a year
ROE
Solvency
the ratio of company total liabilities 
to total assets at the end of a year
Lev
Policy Factor
the natural logarithm of 
government subsidies received by 
the company
Lngov
Other Variables  VC Participation
dummy variable, Inv_after=1 
if it is an observation after VC 
participation, Inv_after=0 if it is an 
observation before VC participation
Inv_after
Table 1.
Variable Definition (contd.)
C. Model Design
To analyze the impact of VC participation on the innovation input of the invested 
company, this paper draws on Chen et al. (2017) and builds a model to examine 
the difference between enterprises with and without VC participation. At the same 
time, it also illustrates how the innovation input of VC-backed companies changes 
after VC firms join in.
LnR&Dit = α0 + α1VC*Inv_afterit + αjControlit + Yi + λt + εit             (2)
Inv_after is a dummy variable that measures whether a VC firm joins in: Inv_after=1 
indicates an observation after VC participation, and Inv_after=0 indicates an 
observation before VC participation. VC*Inv_after is the cross term between 
VC and Inv_after: value 1 means observation of VC-backed companies after VC 
participation, and value 0 means absence of VC participation or an observation 
one year before VC participation. Control indicates other control variables, while 
Y and l  indicate the controls for year and industry fixed effects, respectively.
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To verify Hypotheses 2–5, the following model is established:
LnR&Di = α0 + α1Xi + α2Lnasseti + α3Roei + α4Lngovi + α5Levi + εi (3)
where X refers to syndicated investment characteristics: whether the investment 
is syndicated (Syn), number of syndicated investment members (SynNum), 
reputation (SynRep), and shareholding ratio (ShareHetero).
D. Descriptive Statistics
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Only 208 VC-backed companies 
received syndicated investment, so Syn has 208 observations, of which 145 companies have complete data in the number of 
syndicated investment members (SynNum), reputation (SynRep), and the heterogeneity of shareholding ratio (ShareHetero).
Panel A: the whole sample
Variables
Number of 
Observations
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
LnR&D 1336 16.713 0.772 11.816 20.858
VC*Inv_after 1336 0.495 0.500 0 1
Syn 208 0.697 0.461 0 1
SynNum 145 3.124 1.269 2 7
SynRep 145 0.710 0.455 0 1
ShareHetero 145 1.694 0.733 0 2.999
Lnasset 1336 19.975 0.713 17.730 23.743
ROE 1336 24.820 13.146 1.475 148.838
Lngov 1336 15.225 1.355 0 19.764
Lev 1336 33.992 16.655 1.103 91.070
Panel B: companies with and without VC participation
Variables
Companies without VC 
Participation
(N=447)
Companies with VC 
Participation
(N=889)
Whether 
Supported 
by VC
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
LnR&D 16.654 0.786 16.742 0.763
-0.088**
(-1.973)
Lnasset 19.961 0.770 19.983 0.683
-0.022
(-0.537)
ROE 27.361 14.861 23.542 12.000
3.819***
(5.057)
Lngov 15.075 1.463 15.301 1.292
-0.226***
(-2.890)
Lev 33.610 17.709 34.184 16.106
-0.574
(-0.594)
Table 2.
Summary Statistics on Main Variables
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Table 2 shows summary statistics on the main variables. Panel A refers to the entire 
sample. Note that the proportion of observations of VC-backed companies after 
VC participation is 49.5%, almost half the whole sample; the average value of 
LnR&D is 16.713, with maximum and minimum of 20.858 and 11.816, respectively; 
and 69.7% of 208 VC-backed enterprises obtained syndicated investment. As 
for syndicated investment characteristics, the average number of syndicated 
investment members is 3.124, that is, each company has an average of 3 VC firms 
investing jointly; average age of the leading VC is 0.71, which indicates that 71% of 
the leading VCs have an age of more than 6 years; average value of shareholding 
ratio heterogeneity is 1.694, with the smallest among them 0, which means that 
every VC has the same shareholding ratio. Panel B shows T-test results of companies 
with and without VC participation: R&D expenditure of VC-backed enterprises 
is significantly higher than that of non-VC-backed enterprises; meanwhile, there 
are significant differences in Return on Equity (ROE) and government subsidies 
between these two kinds of companies.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. VC and Innovation Input
This part shows the main empirical results of this paper and analyzes the 
relationship between innovation input and VC/syndicated investment characters.
A1. Endogeneity of VC and Innovation Input
When investing in a venture, VC firms consider factors such as market attractiveness, 
strategy, technology, products or services, customer usage, competition, trading 
conditions, and the quality and experience of the management team (Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2004). The target company may have its own advantages in 
innovation, in which case our research will face endogeneity. Therefore, to rule out 
the possibility that the two kinds of companies have different levels of innovation 
input before VCs make their investment, this paper performs a regression with the 
data of companies without VC participation and VC-backed company observation 
one year before VC participation. Table 3 shows the regression results: in all five 
columns, the regression coefficients of VC are positive, but they are small and 
not significant, which means that R&D expenditure of VC-backed enterprises 
before VC participation is not significantly higher than that of non-VC-backed 
enterprises in the same time period. Further, we use a Probit regression to examine 
the relationship between VC investing decision factors and enterprise innovation 
input. If the coefficient of R&D is significant, the R&D expenditure level of the 
enterprise can be regarded as an important factor to attract VC; that is, VC firms 
pay special attention to the R&D expenditure of the target enterprise when 
selecting their investment projects. Thus, this indicates that the difference between 
the R&D expenditures of VC-backed enterprises and non–VC-backed enterprises 
already exists prior to VC participation. Table 4 shows that the coefficient of R&D 
expenditure is not significant, which means that, in our sample, R&D expenditure 
may not influence VC investing decisions.
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Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression 
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column.
Variables
LnR&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VC 0.055 0.017 0.084 0.064 0.066
(0.67) (0.30) (1.52) (1.22) (1.30)
Lnasset 0.745*** 0.805*** 0.748*** 0.827***
(15.48) (19.09) (17.55) (18.48)
ROE 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(5.99) (6.09) (6.48)
Lngov 0.100*** 0.089***
(4.58) (4.23)
Lev -0.007***
(-4.61)
Constant 15.078*** -0.597 -2.159** -2.581*** -3.541***
(182.33) (-0.59) (-2.39) (-2.99) (-4.14)
Obs 341 341 341 341 341
R2 0.1690 0.5591 0.5970 0.6224 0.6427
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression 
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column. 
Variables
VC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnR&D 0.072 0.039 0.224 0.185 0.202
(0.70) (0.27) (1.46) (1.16) (1.24)
Lnasset 0.049 -0.212 -0.214 -0.253
(0.32) (-1.24) (-1.26) (-1.32)
ROE -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023***
(-3.86) (-3.83) (-3.83)
Lngov 0.061 0.062
(0.96) (0.99)
Lev 0.002
(0.44)
Constant -0.753 -1.187 1.463 1.200 1.551
(-0.41) (-0.52) (0.59) (0.48) (0.59)
Obs 341 341 341 341 341
Table 3.
R&D Before the VC Participation
Table 4.
The Relationship between VC’s Investing Decision Factors and the Invested 
Company’s R&D Expenditure
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A2. Analysis of Regression Results
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression 
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column. 
Variables
LnR&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VC*Inv_after 0.032 0.085** 0.075** 0.074* 0.068*
(1.53) (2.63) (2.27) (2.21) (2.04)
Lnasset 0.374*** 0.409*** 0.408*** 0.398***
(21.88) (23.13) (21.54) (19.56)
ROE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(9.04) (8.94) (6.10)
Lngov 0.002 0.003
(0.53) (0.65)
Lev 0.001*
(2.16)
Constant 15.706*** 8.917*** 8.121*** 8.115*** 8.218***
(195.50) (26.09) (22.99) (23.61) (23.38)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336
R2 0.0658 0.3370 0.3618 0.3642 0.3454
Table 5.
Regression Results of VC and R&D Expenditure
Table 5 shows that VC participation has a significant positive effect on company 
R&D expenditure, and the positive effect remains stable when considering other 
variables. This may be interpreted as showing that VC participation can promote 
R&D expenditure of the invested company. As for the control variables, the firm 
size variable (Lnasset) is positive at the 1% significance level, and the profitability 
variable (j) is positive at the 10% significance level. These results are reasonable, 
because companies with large scale and good profitability may more abundantly 
fund R&D activities. Based on the analysis above, Hypothesis 1 is accepted, that is, 
VC firms can promote invested companies’ innovation input.
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B. Syndicated Investment and Innovation Input
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression 
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column. 
(D) When analyzing the impact of syndicated investment characteristics on company’s innovation input, separate testing of these 
factors may overestimate their effects on the dependent variable, so we have also tested all these factors in one model (column 4 in 
Panel B), and the results are consistent with the results of the separate tests. Due to space constraints, the regression results of the 
control variables are omitted from Panel B. Details can be obtained from authors. 
Panel A: syndicated investment and R&D expenditure
Variables
LnR&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Syn 0.204** 0.116 0.141* 0.145** 0.125*
(2.27) (1.59) (1.95) (2.00) (1.75)
Lnasset 0.876*** 0.843*** 0.832*** 0.790***
(12.54) (11.38) (11.12) (9.93)
ROE 0.015* 0.014* 0.014*
(1.92) (1.85) (1.81)
Lngov 0.021 0.024
(1.15) (1.31)
Lev 0.004
(1.18)
Constant 14.729*** -4.130*** -3.585** -3.69** 0.004
(163.89) (-2.73) (-2.29) (-2.35) (1.18)
Obs 208 208 208 208 208
R2 0.1837 0.5136 0.5257 0.5278 0.5317
Panel B: syndicated investment characteristics and R&D expenditure
Variables
LnR&D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SynNum 0.104** 0.145***
(2.15) (3.66)
SynRep 0.035 0.002
(0.35) (0.20)
ShareHetero -0.272*** -0.327***
(-4.25) (-4.25)
Obs 145 145 145 145
R2 0.5521 0.5264 0.5817 0.6296
Table 6.
Regression Results of Syndicated Investment and R&D Expenditure
Table 6 shows regression results of the relationship between syndicated investment 
and R&D expenditure. First, syndicated investment has a significant positive 
correlation with invested company R&D expenditure, which indicates that 
companies supported by VC syndicated investment have higher innovation input 
than companies supported by only one VC firms. Second, the positive correlation 
between the number of syndicated investment members and company R&D 
expenditure means that the greater the number of syndicated investment members, 
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the higher the R&D expenditure. Moreover, although the leading VC firms’ age 
remains positive with the invested company’s R&D expenditure, the results are not 
significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of syndicated investment members’ 
shareholding ratio heterogeneity is significantly negative, which means that the 
smaller the heterogeneity, the more positive the impact of syndicated investment 
on R&D investment of the companies. In summary, Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, 
and Hypothesis 5 are supported by our empirical evidence.11
C. Robustness Test
This part shows the results of robustness test, in which we created a dummy 
treatment group and a randomly selected experimental group.
C1. Dummy Treatment Group
To test the robustness of the conclusion that VC participation promotes enterprise 
innovation input, we set a dummy treatment group where VC participation 
happens one year later than the reality. The regression results are shown in 
Table 7. It is evident that VC participation has no significant positive impact on 
R&D expenditure, so the test result of Hypothesis 1 in the preceding section 3 is 
credible.
11 Due to length limitations, regression results of the control variables are omitted, but are available 
upon request.
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively; the content in () is the t-statistic. (B) For variable definitions, please check Table 1. (C) Column (1) shows the regression 
results without control variables, columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain one more control variable than the previous column.
Variables
LnR&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VC*Inv_after 0.005 0.030 0.015 0.015 0.008
(0.25) (1.06) (0.55) (0.53) (0.27)
Lnasset 0.354*** 0.393*** 0.391*** 0.380***
(30.53) (29.51) (28.88) (26.67)
ROE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(10.67) (10.46) (6.96)
Lngov 0.004 0.005
(0.98) (1.11)
Lev 0.002
(3.05)
Constant 15.691 9.261*** 8.369*** 8.356*** 8.468***
(209.89) (39.36) (31.23) (31.63) (32.19)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336
R2 0.0649 0.3294 0.3537 0.3574 0.3303
Table 7.
Regression Results of VC and R&D Expenditure (Dummy Treatment Group)
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C2. Randomly Selected Experimental Group
To further test whether our results have omitted-variable bias, we conduct a 
placebo test. Specifically, in our sample, there are 227 VC-backed companies out 
of 341 companies. We first randomly select 227 companies from all 341 enterprises 
and mark them as VC-backed companies (VCR=1), while the rest are designated 
non–VC-backed companies (VCR=0). Then, we create a new variable, Fake 
=VCR*Inv_after. To avoid the impact of rare events, we repeat the random data-
generating process 500 times; the distribution of the 500 estimated coefficients is 
shown in Figure 1. It is evident that the figures are between 0 and 0.1, and our true 
estimate (column 5 of Table 7) is the outlier in the placebo test. This indicates that 
our estimation results do not have serious bias due to omitted variables.
Figure 1. Distribution of 500 Estimated Coefficients
The X-axis is the estimated coefficients of 500 random VCR*Inv_after, the curve is the density distribution of the estimated values, 
and the vertical line is our true estimate (column 5 of Table 7).
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTION
This paper examines the relationship between VC and firm innovation input. The 
results show that VC participation significantly promotes the R&D investment 
of the invested companies. This conclusion coincides with research conclusions 
found in the literature, such as Xu et al. (2015) and Gou and Dong (2014). While 
providing financial support, VC firms also guide the invested company to spend 
more on innovation input by participating in its business decision-making.
Further distinguishing companies that have obtained syndicated investment 
versus sole investment, we find that the number of syndicated investment 
members has a significant positive correlation with innovation input, while the 
heterogeneity of shareholding ratio among syndicated investment members 
is negatively correlated with innovation input. These conclusions relating to 
syndicated investment characteristics provide a valuable reference for enterprises 
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that attach importance to innovation activities in searching for helpful fund 
providers, and they also provide a theoretical basis for VC firms to select their 
joint partners.
This paper’s conclusions indicate that China should actively encourage 
and guide development of the VC industry, and constantly improve its policy, 
institutional, and supervision systems. The government could encourage VC firms 
to invest in startups through subsidies and tax incentives, among other measures, 
and encourage them to adopt a syndicated investment strategy, so that startups 
will be able to spend more on R&D, and the innovation incubation system will 
become more efficient. In addition, the government could guide more social funds 
into the VC industry and reduce investment barriers, thereby broadening the 
financing channels for SMEs and providing adequate financial support for their 
innovation activities.
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